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6	CARRELON COART OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COLINEY
7	SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY
0	MARTIN RINGHOFER,
8	Petitioner,) No. 10-2-41119-4 SEA
9	vs.
10	LINDA K. RIDGE, in her official capacity as) RESPONDENT'S MOTION
11	Deputy Chief Administrative Officer of the King County Superior Court, DEPUTY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO CR 56
)
12	Respondent.)
13	A DEL ME DE CLEGTED AND STATEMENT OF CROUNING
14	I. RELIEF REQUESTED AND STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
15	This case involves an attempt by petitioner to access responses that individuals self-
	reported to the superior court regarding their competency to serve as a juror upon receiving a
16	jury summons. Pursuant to state statute and court rule, the court uses these responses to
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18	preliminarily determine whether the individuals are qualified for jury duty prior to their
19	appearance at the court identified in the summons. Neither state law nor court rule provide
20	petitioner with the right to access this information, nor does the state constitution compel it.
20	Accordingly, respondent Linda K. Ridge respectfully submits this motion for summary judgment

dismissal of all petitioner's claims. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case,

and the documents and declarations submitted with this motion demonstrate that respondent is

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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

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Jury Source List and Master Jury List Process a.

Annually, pursuant to chapter 2.36 RCW, and General Rule (GR) 18, the King County Superior Court receives a jury source list from the Washington State Department of Information Services. In accordance with a Supreme Court order appended to GR 18, King County creates a list by merging the list of King County registered voters and the list of licensed drivers and identicard holders who reside in the County. See also, GR 18(b) (defining jury source list as the product of merging these lists) and RCW 2.36.010(8) (same). The methodology for merging this information is set forth in an appendix to the order, and includes criteria for addressing known or suspected duplicated names. See GR 18, Appendix.

From the jury source list, the Superior Court may create a smaller, master jury list, from which prospective jurors may be summoned. RCW 2.36.055; GR 18, Appendix. The statute also permits courts to forego creating a separate master jury list, and to simply summon jurors off the larger jury source list. See RCW 2.36.010(9) (master jury list may be an exact duplicate of the jury source list). In either case, the designation of jurors summoned for jury duty must be random. GR 18, Appendix (designation of persons on master jury list to be summoned "shall be random"); RCW 2.36.065 (selection of master jury list and jury panels shall be "fair and random").

Preliminary Determination of Juror Qualifications b.

In Washington state, a person is deemed competent to serve as a juror, unless that person:

- Is less than eighteen years of age;
- (2) Is not a citizen of the United States;
- (3) Is not a resident of the county in which he or she has been summoned to serve;
- (4) Is not able to communicate in the English language; or
- (5) Has been convicted of a felony and has not had his or her civil rights restored.

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Pursuant to GR 18(d) and RCW 2.36.072(1), each superior court is required "to establish a means to preliminarily determine by written declaration signed under penalty of perjury by each person summoned, the qualifications set forth in RCW 2.36.070 of each person summoned for jury duty prior the person's appearance at the court to which the person is summoned to appear." If a declarant responds that he or she does not meet the statutory qualifications, that person is to be excused from appearing in response to the summons. RCW 2.36.072(4).

Both the General Rule and statute expressly limit the permissible uses of self-reported juror qualification information:

Information so provided to the court for preliminary determination of qualification for jury duty <u>may only be used for the term such person is summoned and may not be used for any other purpose</u>. Provided, that the court, or its designee, may report a change of address or nondelivery of summons of persons summoned for jury duty to the county auditor.

(Emphasis supplied). GR 18(d); RCW 2.36.072(4).

Petitioner's Requests

On February 22, 2010, the King County Department of Judicial Administration ("DJA") received a public disclosure request from Petitioner Martin Ringhofer. See PRA response letter attached to the Declaration of Thomas Kuffel(Kuffel Dec.) at Exhibit 1. Through the request, petitioner asked for the names and addresses of prospective jurors who were disqualified from jury service in King County between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009 due to age, citizenship, residency, inability to communicate in the English language, felony conviction, or any other reason for disqualification. Id.

¹ Under the King county charter, the department of judicial administration is an executive branch agency that is administered by the superior court clerk, who is appointed and serves at the pleasure of a majority of the superior court judges in the county. The department performs the statutory and court rule functions of the superior court clerk. King County Charter § 350.20.20.

Teresa Bailey, Deputy Director for DJA, responded to petitioner's request. *Id.*. Ms. Bailey advised petitioner that the Public Records Act ("PRA") does not apply to the courts. *Id.* Further, Ms. Bailey informed petitioner that while DJA keeps the Master Jury List, the department is not part of the juror disqualification process. *Id.* Ms. Bailey told petitioner that King County Superior Court administers that process, and she provided him with the contact information for respondent Linda Ridge with King County Superior Court. *Id.*

On February 25, 2010, petitioner sent another e-mail to DJA clarifying his earlier request and, again, Ms. Bailey referred petitioner to respondent at King County Superior Court. *Kuffel Dec. at Exhibit 2(response letter)*.

On October 16, 2010, petitioner sent an e-mail to respondent requesting the following:

- (1) "a list of the names and addresses of 'non-juror information' who were disqualified from jury service in the King Count[sic] jurisdiction for the time period . . . from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2009, for any of the five reasons listed in RCW 2.36.070[;]"
- (2) "the names and addresses of non jurors who were disqualified from jury service from the time period ranging [during the above time period] because of having indicated other reasons for disqualification[;]" and
- (3) "the individual's stated reasons from self-disqualification, and provide the total number of potential jurors on your master lists for 2008 and 2009 and the number of summons you sent to prospective jurors for both years."

Kuffel Dec. at Exhibit 3.

Five business days later, on October 25, respondent provided a response to petitioner's request. See Kuffel Dec. at Exhibit 4 (response letter). First, respondent informed petitioner that the courts are not subject to the PRA and the specific duties imposed by the act did not apply to petitioner's request. Id. Next, respondent explained that access to juror information is governed by court rule and statute. Id. Respondent explained that those authorities restrict the juror information that may be released. Id. Specifically, respondent explained that GR 18(d) states

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that self-reported juror information concerning the qualification requirements in RCW 2.36.070 "'may only be used by the court for the term such person is summoned and may not be used for any other purpose.'" *Id*.

Though respondent was prohibited by law from providing petitioner with the information he requested regarding disqualified individuals, she did provide him with the total number of persons summoned and a list showing the number of disqualified individuals in each RCW 2.36.072 category during the specified time period. *Id.* Further, as provided by GR 31(k), respondent informed petitioner that the master jury source list containing only names and addresses was available for public viewing at the office of the Superior Court Clerk. *Id.*

Respondent received no further correspondence from petitioner until service of this lawsuit.

III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON

This motion is based on the records and pleadings herein as well as the Declaration of Thomas Kuffel with the exhibits attached thereto, and the arguments and authorities cited herein.

VI. ARGUMENT

The information requested by petitioner is, as he calls it, non-juror information. He seeks information only related to those persons who have been disqualified from jury service due to age, residency, language, felony conviction, or other self-disqualification. The relevant court rule and state law make clear that this information is not available for public inspection.

Respondent fulfilled her duty to follow the court rule and state law by denying petitioner access to the protected non-juror information. Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandate, declaratory or injunctive relief, or relief under GR 31.

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions and any affidavits, taken together, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). A genuine issue of material facts exists where reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if it submits affidavits establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ranger Insur. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008) (citing Meyer v. Univ. of Washington, 105 Wn.2d 847, 719 P.2d 98 (1986)). The nonmoving party avoids summary judgment when it "set[s] forth specific facts which sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and disclose the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact." Id. The nonmoving party "may not rely on speculation, [or] argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain." Id. (citing Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986)).

The foregoing standard of review must be applied in the context of the particular relief petitioner is seeking in this case. As to his request for mandamus and injunctive relief, petitioner's burden is high. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash.2d 402, 407, 879 P.2d 920 (1994). A party seeking a writ of mandamus must show that (1) the party subject to the writ has a clear duty to act; (2) the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (3) the petitioner is beneficially interested. RCW 7.16.160, .170. Further, the duty to act must be ministerial in nature rather than discretionary. Brown v. Owen, 165 Wn.2d 706, 725, 206 P.3d 310(2009).

Petitioner's request for declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of the statute also involves a high burden. When analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, a court must begin with the presumption that a legislative act is constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality has the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982); Miller v. U.S., 73 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1995).

For the reasons set forth below, petitioner cannot, as a matter of law, meet the high burden required for mandamus, injunctive or declaratory relief, nor is he entitled to relief under GR 31. Respondent is therefore entitled to summary dismissal of this action.

B. <u>GR 18(d) and RCW 2.36.072(4) Do Not Allow Dissemination of Juror Qualification Responses.</u>

As an initial matter, petitioner fashioned his requests for juror information under the Public Records Act ("PRA"). However, the PRA clearly does not apply in this instance. City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wn.2d 341, 346 (2009) (PRA does not apply to the judicial branch); see also, Spokane & Eastern Lawyer v. Tompkins, 136 Wn. App. 616 (2007) (superior court not an "agency" under public records act); Nast v. Michels, 107 Wn. 2d 300, 305-307 (1986) (courts are not within the realm of the public disclosure act). Therefore, petitioner must identify another avenue through which to allege that he is entitled to the juror information. In this instance, petitioner relies on RCW 2.36.072 and GR 18.

The information requested by petitioner is information provided to the court by potential jurors for the preliminary determination of their qualifications to serve as jurors. As cited earlier, GR 18 and RCW 2.36.072 mandate that this information may only be used for the purpose of preliminarily determining juror qualification, with a limited exception, and may not be used for any other purpose. See GR 18(d); RCW 2.36.072(4).

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registration records is not a purpose provided for under the statute or rule. Accordingly, under the plain language of each, it is not allowed. See Petition at ¶19.

Disseminating juror qualification information to petitioner to conduct research on voting

Had the Legislature intended that a permissible use of the preliminary juror disqualification information be for research into voter registration eligibility, it would have listed that in RCW 2.36.072. In fact, state legislators proposed bills in 2008, 2010 and this year that would amend RCW 2.36.072 to require the courts to send the County Auditor and the Secretary of State a list of jurors disqualified due to age, citizenship, residency, and felony conviction. See H.B. 3159, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., Sec. 1 (Wash. 2008); S.B. 6527, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); and S.B. 5855, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). See Kuffel Dec. at Exhibit 5. Had it been adopted, the latter bill would have required the court to create and maintain a list of all disqualified prospective jurors and make it open for public inspection. Id. Thus far, however, the Legislature has declined to so expand the permissible uses of preliminary juror qualification information.

Additionally, had the Legislature intended that preliminary juror disqualification information be available upon request by members of the public, it would not have stated that the information could be used only for the term for which the person is summoned. "Jury term" is defined as a period of time of one or more days, not exceeding one month, during which summoned jurors must be available to report for juror service. See RCW 2.36.010(10). State retention schedules require that the preliminary juror disqualification information be kept only until the end of the jury term. See Kuffel Dec. at Exhibit 6 (excerpted page from local government records retention schedule). If the Legislature intended for the information to be available to the public, it would not have allowed for such prompt destruction of it.

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The statute and court rule prohibit release of preliminary juror qualification information to petitioner. Respondent did what the law required when she denied petitioner's request for the information.

C. <u>Petitioner is Not Entitled to Juror Qualification Information under GR 31(j)</u>
General Rule 31 governs access to court records. Subsection (j) states:

Access to Juror Information. Individual juror information, other than name, is presumed to be private. After the conclusion of a jury trial, the attorney for a party, or party pro se, or member of the public, may petition the trial court for access to individual juror information under the control of the court. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the petitioner to have access to relevant information. The court may require that juror information not be disclosed to other persons.

While this rule permits access to juror information upon a showing of good cause, it is not relevant to the information requested by petitioner in this case. The rule only applies "[a]fter conclusion of a jury trial," and therefore applies only to information regarding jurors who were called to serve for that trial, not jurors who were preliminarily disqualified from service under RCW 2.36.072. Accordingly, petitioner's reliance on the rule in this instance is misplaced.

 State Law Restrictions on the Disclosure of Preliminary Juror Qualification Information Are Constitutional.

In the event RCW 2.36.072 and GR 18(d) prohibit his access to the preliminary juror disqualification information, petitioner's fallback position is that the statute and rule are unconstitutional. He claims that such an interpretation of the statute and rule would violate article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. See Petition at ¶ 14.

Preliminarily, it does not appear that petitioner has served the attorney general with this lawsuit and is therefore precluded by RCW 7.24.110 from challenging the constitutionality of the statute.²

² RCW 7.24.110 provides:

Regardless, petitioner misinterprets article I, section 10, as it does not apply to the information he requested. Article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution states, "Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." This provision guarantees the public and the press a right of access to judicial proceedings and court documents in both civil and criminal cases. *Dreiling v. Jain*, 151 Wn.2d 900, 908, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). It applies to trials, pretrial hearings, transcripts of pretrial hearings or trials, exhibits introduced at pretrial hearings and voir dire proceedings. *Seattle Times v. Eberharter*, 105 Wn.2d 144, 155, 713 P.2d 710 (1986); *State v. Duckett*, Wn.App. 797, 173 P.3d 948 (2007) (*citing State v. Easterling*, 157 Wn.2d 167 174, 137 P.3d 825 (2006); *State v. Brightman*, 155 Wn.2d 506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005) (voir dire proceeding). The right of access also applies to summary judgments and other dispositive motions that adjudicate the substantive rights of the parties, like a full trial. *Dreiling*, 151 Wn.2d at 910, 918 (motion to terminate shareholder derivative action with the scope of article I, section 10).

Conversely, our appellate courts have declined to find a right of access in matters that are not trials or pretrial hearings or do not involve documents introduced into the court record:

As this information [obtained in discovery] does not become part of the court's decision making process, article I, section 10 does not speak to its disclosure. However the same cannot be said for materials attached to a summary judgment motion. Summary judgment effectively adjudicates the substantive rights of the parties, just like a full trial. Accordingly, when previously sealed discovery documents are attached in support of a summary judgment motion, they lose their character as the raw fruits of discovery.

When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.

(Emphasis added).

³ A related provision, article I, section 22, guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy, public trial.

(Emphasis added.) Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 909-910.

In *Eberharter*, likewise, this Court found no public right of access to judicial proceedings relating to the criminal investigatory process, such as search warrant affidavits in unfiled criminal cases. *Eberharter*, 105 Wn.2d at 156-57. See also, Buehler v. Small, 115 Wn. App. 914, 921, 64 P.2d 78 (2003) (no constitutional right to access a judge's notes as they were not part of any case record and did not constitute transcripts of criminal proceedings or exhibits).

In this instance, the preliminary juror disqualification information requested by petitioner is obviously not part of a trial, motion or pre-trial proceeding. Indeed, it is not even related to a "court case." At the time jurors are preliminarily disqualified, they have not yet been assigned to sit in the jury pool for a particular case. Similarly, the requested information does not constitute a "court record" as defined by GR 31 because it is not connected with or related to a judicial proceeding. Further, the information requested by petitioner relates to mandatory reasons for disqualification. By law, the disqualified individuals cannot sit on a jury -- there is no discretion as to disqualification to be exercised by a judge.

It is also important to recognize that petitioner himself is not seeking the preliminary juror disqualification information in order to observe or check the judicial system. He has

GR 31(4) provides:

"Court record" includes, but is not limited to: (i) Any document, information, exhibit, or other thing that is maintained by a court in connection with a judicial proceeding, and (ii) Any index, calendar, docket, register of actions, official record of the proceedings, order, decree, judgment, minute, and any information in a case management system created or prepared by the court that is related to a judicial proceeding. Court record does not include data maintained by or for a judge pertaining to a particular case or party, such as personal notes and communications, memoranda, drafts, or other working papers; or information gathered, maintained, or stored by a government agency or other entity to which the court has access but which is not entered into the record. (Emphasis supplied).